Background
During the last parts of 1990s the focus on safety was gradually weakened in the companies working on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS). Rationalisation and cost efficiency were high on the agenda. Gradually priorities changed while many managers involved perceived that they still were on a positive trend regarding safety performance. Most people thought that they could keep up the momentum on safety while at the same time focusing on cost and productivity.
Project work in the Norwegian Oil Industry Association (OLF) on safety issues did not result in notable improvements any longer and we did not produce the safety results we expected.
The trend was in fact reversing, and instead of improvements we could see a negative trend in some companies.
The industry was accused of not taking safety seriously any longer. Employees expressed their concern in public, and the public at large was sceptical.
The Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) (NPD at that time) had for some time expressed their concern, not only based on statistics, but also on an objective review of the situation through their supervision of the industry.
A debate took place in the media on the topic of safety, outlining the theme “How safe is safe enough?”. While management representatives from the industry claimed that safety standards had never been higher, unions, authorities, politicians and the general public were of the opinion that safety standards had deteriorated and that the safety statistics published did not give a true picture. The differences in opinions on the actual situation indicated clearly that stakeholders were far apart. The situation culminated when the Norwegian parliament requested a White Paper on safety.
This was a very serious situation for the industry’s reputation. Something had to be done!
A co-operation between all stakeholders was necessary, but it was not obvious how to initiate this and how to co-operate.
How did we go about it?
OLF took an initiative by inviting all stakeholders to an open dialogue on the issue of safety in the Norwegian oil & gas industry.
A key success factor would be to identify a facilitator who was accepted by all parties for his/her integrity, who had a standing in the industry, and knew the industry and the key people in the organisations involved. A background from HSE was deemed to be an advantage but not crucial for the task.
Luckily we found a candidate, a recently retired Statoil HSE Director, Mr. Gunnar Heiberg-Andersen. He was acceptable to all parties as a facilitator and project manager.
An invitation to a kick-off meeting was sent to the employer associations and trade unions involved. A similar invitation was sent to PSA. They all accepted and a meeting was held concluding that one should establish a project with Mr. Gunnar Heiberg-Andersen as the manager. All parties were represented with one or two representatives in the project steering committee. PSA was asked to take on an observer role in the project.
The first task in the project was to create a project team consisting of the individuals nominated as representatives from their respective organisations. This was a must in order to establish co-operation for better safety performance.
Trust was lacking, but had to be established. The key issue was therefore to create trust amongst the participants - trust that was personal and sustainable. It goes without saying that this was difficult and we had to spend much time and efforts on this.
Experts on teambuilding and organisational training were hired in order to enhance the process of making these individuals into a team. A series of meetings and seminars were conducted within the project task force. Experts on organisational issues and change management acted as facilitators. Hours and hours were spent talking to each other in order to create a true team. The teambuilding was also based on social events like “away days”, lunches and dinners.
Trust and confidence were built by starting a discussion on the present status. What did the statistical figures tell us? Did the safety statistics give a true reflection of reality? Were we comparing “apples with apples”? Could we find another way of describing the present situation than by statistics?
The communication problem was rooted in stakeholders’ different perceptions and knowledge. There was a wide range of perceptions. Some confused safety with comfort or welfare, while others were critical to the way safety was managed and said that the safety standards had deteriorated over the last decade, without being too specific on how this was measured. To communicate understandable facts is quite simple, but to communicate opinions or perceptions can be difficult.
The lesson learned was that we had to focus on an open and transparent dialogue, involving all parties concerned. We had to make sure that there was a common understanding of the issue in question and we had to be honest with each other.
Gradually a mutual trust was built up and one could agree on the first activities to take part in outside the project task force. First of all it was decided to interview top managers of companies, contractors, unions, politicians, academia and relevant authorities. Teams from the project task force conducted the interviews.
The objective of these extensive interviews was to establish an agreed “baseline” for the safety level, and at the same time to assess remedies needed in order to improve. The interviews revealed many different opinions and suggestions for improvement. The main task for the project team was now to evaluate all interviews, assess the validity, and draw conclusions.
With much facilitation of the discussion some facts were agreed upon. The first and most obvious fact to be agreed was that “it was difficult, but necessary to have communication and a constructive dialogue”. When everybody agreed to this rather obvious and simple statement, one could put this statement on a list of “agreements” and go on to the next topic; to find a mutually agreed description of the present situation regarding safety and the working environment in our industry.
The discussion concentrated on four main topics:
· Management involvement
· The focus and priority on HSE
· Job security
· The status of contractor employees
The background for this discussion was the outcome of the interviews with the top managers and leaders.
SfS did reach an internal agreement and could state the following description of reality:
· Management had become less focused on HSE
· HSE was under duress
· The present situation was less predictable for individuals wanting job security
· Contractor employees were treated differently from Company employees
Management less focused on HSE.
After the tragedy of Piper Alpha, the whole industry was in shock. We experienced a strengthening of HSE management from all parties involved and there was a focus on safety throughout the industry. Management was told by shareholders and authorities that safety was a must, and that any substandard safety practices would not be tolerated.
Safety was on top of the agenda for a long time. Safety Cases were made and behavioural science became a hot topic within safety management. Campaigns were launched and programmes were followed up. Objectives were set, and tasks and targets were allocated to individuals. Everything seemed to go right with regard to improving safety. The unfortunate thing was that the safety behaviour programmes concentrated on people at the “sharp end” of the business. The idea seemed to be that managers were always doing the right things.
But gradually people in the industry became complacent and trusted that safety had been sorted out once and for all. The employee perception was that management had lost focus on safety. Other important business objectives like production volume, cost, taxes and rationalisation were given higher priority. Managers thought that everything was in good order because Safety Cases were in place for all installations and campaigns had been successfully run. Now, that safety had been “sorted out” the management turned its attention to another important topic; cost and efficiency. The result was more haste, less planning of jobs and above all, corners were cut in order to meet schedules. This was a common view talking to the employees.
The demand for cost efficiency, lower manning and high production was perceived to mean that managers consented to corners being cut. This perception was quite dominant in middle management. They felt squeezed between the demand from management for lower cost per barrel and the demand for safe operations from the workforce.
The normal outcome of such a conflict is that you tend to land on what your boss is demanding from you.
It was hard to establish whether this view was the general one, but some managers admitted that elements of the description could fit with the present situation.
Some managers claimed that statistics showed safety on the right track. Lost Time Injury Frequency (LTIF) showed a better result than in earlier years. They could not understand why others were complaining. By studying the statistics one could easily see why LTIF figures showed improvement. The reduced number of LTIs was compensated by an increased number of “Medical Treatment Cases” and “Restricted Work Cases”. As long as the performance targets and bonus systems were based on LTIF the LTIF showed a decreasing tendency. If bonuses and scorecards had been based on TRCF (Total Recordable Case Frequency) the picture would have been different, but still not necessarily true. We are creative when it comes to meeting scorecard targets and bonuses based on reactive indicators!
This simple example tells us that safety can not be measured by LTIF or TRCF alone. These reactive indicators are important, but they are certainly not suitable when they are linked to bonuses and scorecard systems, nor when they are used for evaluation of contractor performance. A contractor who knows that the next contract depends on his LTIF is very likely to become creative when it comes to reporting and classifying incidents. Our present HSE culture is not at a stage where we are always honest about our performance, measured by reactive indicators.
HSE under duress.
Managers have always been measured on performance. The key performance indicator for management has traditionally been the bottom line for the company measured in financial terms.
All initiatives for safety improvements had their cost. The oil price was gradually declining and cost cutting programmes were introduced. Nothing wrong with cost consciousness, but there has to be a balance. In this case the balance was not there. The managers’ focus on safety gradually declined. Maintenance and inspection budgets were cut. The number of HSE positions was reduced. Training budgets were cut, etc. all in order to meet budget requirements. The focus was on economics and no longer on HSE.
The managers and middle management became more and more focused on short-term targets, and on meeting the targets and expectations on a yearly basis. Long-term objectives were not focused on because they implied cost allocations that did not help meeting the yearly targets. Who would spend money on establishing a good HSE culture, when you are measured on a LTIF target for that particular year? Improvements in HSE take time. Safety has never been a quick fix!
All this created expectations in management and middle management that safety had to improve according to the resources available at the time and preferably at a steadily lower cost. Hence safety was something one considered under duress.
A less predictable situation with regard to job security.
The focus on budgets and costs was very visible. The business environment had changed over time. The swing from long-term contracts to shorter contracts was evident. Long-term personal relations between parties were replaced by a much more business-like attitude: “Stick to the contract”.
The short-term contracts resulted in much more pressure on cost and efficiency. Contractors were squeezed and had their margins cut. Rationalisation campaigns were launched every so often, and staff began to worry about their jobs. Rather than concentrating on doing the work in a safe way, their minds were filled with thoughts like: Do I have a job next week? Who will pay my mortgage? If I cut some “safety corners” I can demonstrate that I am efficient and can get the job done! When you don’t concentrate on doing the job safely, you are bound to have an accident. And that is exactly what happened.
Jobs became uncertain and it was difficult to plan for the future, whether you should plan company activities or personal ones.
Supervisors felt the pressure on efficiency. One way to demonstrate their ability to cope with the requirements was to cut safety corners, not on purpose, but by accepting safety standards not normally tolerated. Safety was perceived to be an extra burden and something that hampered progress in the work.
In the longer term this situation of job insecurity also had an unexpected effect; it became difficult to recruit new university graduates. Students did not want to join an industry which had insecure jobs and was perceived as having a bad safety record. The industry reputation was at stake.
Contractor employees were treated in a different way.
Historically a contractor has been looked upon as someone who was there to assist in the work. This implies that company employees see themselves as bosses and that contractors are just work hands. This view was demonstrated clearly in many small things: Who had to wait for the next flight when the homebound helicopter was full? Who had priority for single cabins? Who was denied access to a PC? Who was not invited to social events paid for by the company?
These differences obviously created a disharmony between the two categories. There had always been a difference, but now it was accentuated.
The working environment was not constructive, because contractors felt unfairly treated. How can you create a good HSE culture when people are treated so differently?
Many people claimed that it was not that bad. The challenge was to eliminate this discrimination, whether it was just imagined or a reality. As a result of the unpredictable business environment the different categories of employees were also treated differently. You may think that this difference in treatment is natural, but in the Norwegian culture equality is a much-appreciated norm, and hence this phenomenon was not well received.
Remedies for improvement
Another result of the interviews was that the different opinions on short-term and long-term remedial actions were fleshed out. All remedial actions were grouped and made more specific.
Five main project groups were identified:
- General HSE
- Maritime operations
- Crane and lifting operations
- Harmonisation of safety-related procedures
- Harmonisation of safety routines
For each project group, several workgroups were identified to undertake specific tasks.
A process owner was appointed for each project group with the mandate to establish and organise the respective workgroups, facilitate the work and report back to the SfS project manager on status and with the final products.
Before the workgroups were established, the tasks were thoroughly discussed in SfS in order to give the right prioritisation and to reap any “low hanging fruits”. By concentrating on a few tasks with a high likelihood of success we could secure enthusiasm and faith in SfS.
The SfS members were asked to nominate personnel to participate in the workgroups.
Deliverables from the workgroups were identified and we also specified a process for acceptance of the proposals from the workgroups.
As a tri-partite project we are not in a position to operate any platform or facility. Our main task has been to identify Best Practices and recommend these to the parties involved. They in turn have committed themselves to implement our recommendations. If the recommendation is followed by a guideline, the guideline becomes mandatory unless there are very good reasons not to implement it. To strengthen the message, PSA is including the SfS recommended guidelines in their supervisory activities. Hence, failure to implement the guidelines requires an explanation to PSA.
A recommendation is stipulating both the scope and the schedule for implementation of the guideline.
Most of the population in offshore Norway are “nomads” who often change their place of work. By having common systems and standards the safety risk will decrease because of the uniformity of Best Practice. This is why two of the project groups have concentrated on harmonisation. This enhancement of harmonisation is also directed towards adoption of international standards where applicable.
The very first challenge in this work of harmonisation was the syndrome of “not invented here”. Some of the facilitators have gone to a lot of effort to convince the participants that they were not necessarily always in possession of best practice.
Success factors
The key to success has been the commitment from all parties involved. The first commitment made was that all associations and trade unions involved had to sign a Mandate for SfS. Here they committed themselves regarding manpower and financial contributions. Most important, though, was their commitment to implement “Best Practice” recommended by SfS. PSA also signed the Mandate, and this means that they are looking for the implementation of Best Practises recommended by SfS in their supervisory activities. In other words; the industry is committed to implement and the Authority is committed to supervise and give feedback on the results. These strong commitments have been crucial to our success.
SfS had to build and maintain its own integrity. If just one of the participants questioned the integrity of the project or the project manager, we would have faced a serious setback. SfS also had to build good relations to managers in the companies involved and to the leaders in the respective unions. Good relations and a mutual trust were seen as crucial for success.
New representatives to SfS have been through an introduction programme to ensure integrity and trust. In this programme the roles and modus operandi are explained, and the ”old” representatives are introduced.
SfS has its own budget. Funding has so far been provided by OLF, but we are now seeking other sources as well. Our aim is to increase the administrative manpower in order to be more effective and utilise our resources in a better way.
We are putting much thought into selecting the different leaders for the workgroups. The idea is to find individuals who can grasp the task given in a mandate for the workgroup. He/she has to be enthusiastic and pragmatic in finding a balance between the challenge of solving the problem and creating an ownership of the final product amongst all participants in the workgroup. This is a real challenge. If we find the right leader we can almost guarantee a success for the product. Representatives to the workgroups are nominated by the individual companies and unions. SfS has no control over who are appointed as representatives. Our job is to make sure the representatives feel comfortable in their role in the workgroup. Teambuilding and coaching are ingredients in this work.
To follow up the work in the workgroups and to coordinate the different groups, SfS has nominated “Process owners” from the Steering Committee. They report challenges and progress in the work to the Steering Committee. They also have a duty to report back to the workgroups with any comments or appraisals. This two-way communication has proved important.
Another important aspect is the formal process where we make sure of the quality of and approve the products coming out of the workgroups. A flowchart describing this process was thoroughly discussed before agreement. The importance of having a robust hearing process must not be underestimated.
SfS has so far concentrated on two main products in addition to conferences and facilitation of specialist forum. The two products are: recommendations and guidelines.
A recommendation given by SfS is distributed to the industry for them to implement. The recommendation is not prescriptive, but rather a functional description of activities to reach an objective. The details on how to go about it are left to the individual companies.
The guidelines are sent as proposals to the individual organisations for them to issue. So far no organisation has ever refused to issue a SfS proposed guideline or to change the text proposed. A SfS proposed guideline from OLF or one of the other employer organisations is seen as a “norm” in the Norwegian legislative system. PSA will focus on the guideline for health and /or safety in their supervisory activities.
One of the obstacles to our work has been the industry scepticism about SfS producing standards. Let us make one thing clear; SfS has no intention of producing any standard. Our aim is to harmonise the work practices already in use, aiming at a mutual agreement on the present “best practice”. What is “best practice” today is not always “best practice” tomorrow, and for this reason the workgroups are on standby and are called if and when a revision is deemed necessary. This is how we make sure “best practice” develops in a dynamic way.
Achievements
So far SfS has organised nine conferences on different topics. Two of the conferences have resulted in two new specialist forums being set up, one for crane operators and one for elected safety delegates. Both specialist groups suffered from lack of network and lack of “best practice” identification. At present SfS is trying to help solve some teething problems, and the progress is promising.
26 different workgroups have been established and they have so far produced 15 guidelines and recommendations for the industry.
Special achievements to be mentioned are: A common system for Permit to Work (PtW) and Safe Job Analyses (SJA) and a common Station Bill. These are made uniform on the NCS. The result is that the “nomads”, i.e. the contractors moving from one installation to another have the same setup for PtW and SJA wherever they work. The harmonised station bill means that the same contractors have the same alarm phone number and the same alarm signals and warning lights irrespective of installation. This is important because these contractors constitute approx. 70 % of the offshore population.
As recognition for this work the International Regulators Offshore Safety Forum in 2005 awarded SfS “The Carolita U.Kallaur Award for Outstanding International Safety Leadership”. This recognition has been very much appreciated and has been a tremendous inspiration for further work to improve health and safety.
The way forward
The way forward will be characterised by the same modus operandi as has proven successful to date, getting all parties involved in order to achieve ownership and commitment to recommendations and guidelines.
The work will continue along three main lines:
- HSE culture
- Organisation and structure
- Operational aspects
We are now in the process of detailing the work programme under these headings.
HSE culture.
Here we will concentrate on the topics of management, communication and mutual trust, and responsibility/accountability. Harmonisation of HSE awareness training has already started.
Organisation and structure.
The main theme here will be equal treatment of all employees, irrespective of their employment status. Focus will be on sub-contractor staff.
Another topic is the Safety Delegate system. They need assistance to function in an optimal way.
Operational aspects.
In this field we will continue to concentrate on lifting operations, where safety improvements are still needed. Falling objects is another topic which will be continued.
We still have too many gas leakages, and a monitoring programme is implemented and will be enhanced.
Maritime operations have been in focus since the start of SfS. This focus will continue.
The key word for all these activities is Harmonisation. Our postulate is that we can reduce risk quite considerably by harmonising the different modus operandi that we find throughout the industry. Our aim is to identify and recommend Best Practice in order to reduce risk and improve safety performance.
Conclusions
The SfS project has become a “permanent” body in as much as it has been decided that SfS shall identify and describe Best Practice in industry. As Best Practice is dynamic in its nature, SfS will continuously monitor the industry and suggest improvements.
Our focus has been on harmonisation of work practises to ease the situation for most of the personnel working offshore. This has given benefits with regard to both efficiency and reducing the safety risk.
As for creating good working relations and hence facilitating a good HSE culture, SfS and its work has demonstrated that through a tri-partite process we have been able to develop and maintain a good HSE culture within the SfS team, despite our weak starting point.
Lessons learned from this process are now available to all participants.
Acknowledgements
Our sincere thanks go to all participating organisations in SfS. Their commitment has been crucial for our success.
The authors would also like to acknowledge members of the Steering Committee and everyone who has participated in the SfS workgroups. They have made SfS recommendations and guidelines possible.
References
Visit our website on www.samarbeidforsikkerhet.no where you will find both a Norwegian and an English version.The OLF Guidelines are available on www.olf.no under Reports/Guidelines.
Participating organisations are:
DSO The Co-operate Organisation (Trade union for marine personnel)
www.dnmf.no/dso
FF The Norwegian United Federation of Trade Unions
www.fellesforbundet.no
Lederne Norwegian organization for managers and supervisors www.lederne.no
LO The Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions
www.lo.no
NOPEF The Norwegian Oil and Petrochemical Workers’ Union
www.nopef.no
Norsk Industri Federation of Norwegian Industries
www.norskindustri.no
NR Norwegian Shipowners’ Association
www.rederi.no
OLF The Norwegian Oil Industry Association
www.olf.no
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority (observer) (the former NPD)
www.ptil.no
